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Abstract. This essay first applies the general issue of realism vs. antirealism to 
theology and the philosophy of religion, distinguishing between several different 
‘levels’ of the realism dispute in this context. A  pragmatic approach to the 
problem of realism regarding religion and theology is sketched and tentatively 
defended. The similarities and differences of scientific realism, on the one hand, 
and religious and/or theological realism, on the other hand, are thereby also 
illuminated. The concept of recognition is shown to be crucially relevant to the 
issue of realism especially in its pragmatist articulation.
INTroDuCTIoN
When examining the problems and prospects of realism in religion and 
theology, we should begin by contextualizing the realism vs. antirealism 
debate (or, better, debates) into different local problem areas.1 I  will 
begin with some brief remarks on relatively standard varieties of realism 
(or the problem of realism) and then move on to applications of these 
realisms in the field of the philosophy of religion. Toward the end of 
the essay, I will introduce my own preferred pragmatist perspective on 
the realism controversy, enriched with a notion not usually employed by 
pragmatist philosophers, namely, the notion of recognition.
1 See, for instance, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Critical Scientific Realism (oxford and New York: 
oxford university Press, 1999), for a  very helpful classification of different forms of 
realism. A major recent collection of articles on various aspects of the realism issue is 
Kenneth r. Westphal (ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism (london and New York: 
routledge, 2014).
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First of all, as is well known, realism has been a major theme in the 
philosophy of science over the past few decades, and continues to be 
actively discussed by philosophers of science. According to scientific 
realism, there ‘really’ are unobservable theoretical entities postulated in 
scientific theories (or, in a somewhat more careful formulation, it is up 
to the world itself to determine whether or not there are such entities); 
those theories have truth-values independently of our knowledge and 
experience; and scientific progress may be understood as convergence 
toward mind-independently objective (‘correspondence’) truth about the 
world. These features of scientific realism may, furthermore, have more 
specific applications in sub-fields such as the philosophy of physics, the 
philosophy of biology, or the philosophy of history. Another interesting 
example is mathematical realism, according to which numbers and other 
mathematical entities and/or structures somehow mind-independently 
exist (possibly in a Platonic world of eternal Forms), and our mathematical 
truths about them are mind-independently what they are.
Clearly, the realism debate is not restricted to the philosophy of 
science. In ethics (or, rather, metaethics), moral realism has been a major 
topic of dispute for decades, too. This controversy is about whether there 
are objective moral values and/or mind-independent moral truths about 
‘moral facts’ (or, perhaps better, about the nature of the moral values there 
mind-independently are, or are not). Just as the scientific realist believes 
in the objective truth-values of scientific theories, even when they 
postulate observation-transcendent theoretical entities and structures, 
and the antirealist denies that theories have such truth-values, especially 
insofar as they are about the unobservable, the moral realist maintains 
that moral statements are objectively true or false (even though their 
truth or falsehood cannot, of course, be immediately perceived), while 
the antirealist argues that this is not the case (for instance, for the reason 
that moral ‘statements’ are not really factual statements at all but moral 
discourse is, instead, mere expression of attitudes, such as emotions). 
more generally, axiological realism is the view that values (including 
not only moral but also aesthetic, epistemic, and other values) are real, 
instead of being mere human projections or constructions.
Highly important dimensions of the realism issue are also discussed 
and debated in relation to other traditional core areas of philosophy, such 
as general metaphysics. For example, the modal realist seeks to formulate 
a  realistic account of the modalities, i.e., possibilities and necessities. 
According to such realism, possibilities, for instance, are ‘real’ – or there 
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are real possible worlds in addition to the actual world. A related – and 
ancient – form of realism is realism about universals, that is, the kind 
of realism about the Forms that may (or may not) be instantiated in 
particular objects that classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle (in 
their different ways) maintained. metaphysicians and epistemologists 
have also debated about realism about the past (and about future, or 
about temporality in general). The question here is whether past (and 
future) objects and events really mind- and discourse-independently 
exist and whether statements about the past – analogously to statements 
about the unobservable world in science – have objective truth-values. 
And many other examples of realism and antirealism in different sub-
fields of philosophy can easily be distinguished. These are all, as we may 
say, different local versions of realism (vs. antirealism).
These contextualizations or localizations of the problem of realism 
are to be distinguished from the quite different distinctions between 
the various philosophical dimensions of the general or global realism 
issue that concerns the mind- and discourse-independence (vs. 
dependence) of reality in general. The ontological realism question is, 
of course, whether there is a  mind- and language-independent world 
at all. Epistemologically, we may ask whether we can know something 
(or anything) about such an  independent world. The semantic realist, 
furthermore, maintains that we can refer to such a world by using our 
language and/or concepts; according to such realism, our statements 
about the world are mind-independently true or false, and truth is 
typically construed as correspondence with the way things are. All these 
differentiations between the dimensions of realism and antirealism can 
also be applied more locally to the kind of issues preliminarily listed 
above. For example, scientific or modal realism can be discussed from the 
point of view of the ontological, epistemological, or semantic dimension 
of the realism issue.2
2 There has also been some debate over which dimension is the most important one. 
michael Devitt is famous for the view that realism is a purely ontological thesis about 
the mind-independent existence of certain kinds of entities, either about something in 
general or about specific classes of entities such as the theoretical entities of science. See 
Devitt, Realism and Truth, 2nd ed. (oxford and Cambridge, mA: blackwell, 1991; 1st 
ed. 1984). This contrasts with michael Dummett’s equally well-known view that realism 
is a semantic issue about whether statements of certain types (e.g., about the past) have 
truth values that are objectively determined. See, e.g., michael Dummett, The Seas of 
Language (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
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The concept of independence – as well as, conversely, dependence – is 
crucially important for the entire realism discussion. According to typical 
forms of realism, the world is (largely) independent of various things: 
minds or subjects; their experiences, perceptions, and observations; 
concepts or conceptual schemes; language, linguistic frameworks, or 
language-games; theories and models; scientific paradigms; perspectives 
or points of view; traditions; practices; and so forth. I will mostly just 
use ‘mind-independent’ as a shorthand for all these and other standard 
forms of independence (to be contrasted with the relevant kinds of 
dependence). Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the realism 
discussion, the relevant concept of (in)dependence is, at least primarily, 
ontological: A is ontologically dependent on b, if and only if A cannot 
(or could not) exist unless b exists. Different modal forces are of course 
invoked insofar as this definition is formulated in terms of ‘cannot’ or 
‘could not’, respectively. This ontological notion of (in)dependence, in 
both stronger (‘could not’) and weaker (‘cannot’) modal versions, is to 
be distinguished from, for example, logical (in)dependence and causal 
(in)dependence. Statements or theories are logically independent of 
each other insofar as there is no logical entailment between them. (It 
is hard to say in what sense exactly the notions of logical dependence 
and independence could even be applied to the relation between, say, 
a statement and a non-linguistic fact, insofar as entailment is a relation 
between logical, propositional, and/or linguistic entities.) regarding 
causal dependence and independence, we may say that, for example, 
a table is causally dependent on its maker but ontologically independent 
of her/him because it can continue to exist when s/he dies. When made, 
its existence no more ontologically presupposes its maker’s existence – 
even though antirealists may deny that the table, or anything, could 
exist entirely independently of human beings’ thought, language, or 
experience.
Now that we have reached a preliminary conception of what kinds of 
realism there are, globally and locally, we should also get clear about the 
different varieties of antirealism. There are, in fact, many quite distinct 
antirealisms, or several ways of being an antirealist, both globally and 
locally. An easy way of listing such antirealisms would be to just list the 
denials of the corresponding realisms. However, let me briefly indicate 
in what sense some traditionally best-known antirealisms are opposed 
to realism.
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First, idealism is often represented as a  version of antirealism. The 
problem here, however, is that idealists can also be realists, depending 
on how exactly these views are defined (there will be more to be said 
on this matter below in relation to pragmatism). Another key version of 
antirealism is, as is well known, relativism, according to which the way the 
world is is relative to, for instance, conceptual schemes or perspectives. 
There is, then, no way the world is ‘in itself ’, perspective- or scheme-
independently. relativism is often relatively close to constructivism 
(which can also be compared to at least some forms of idealism): we 
‘construct’ the world in and through our perspectival language, discourse, 
or conceptualization, and it is precisely for this reason that there is no 
non-relative existence at all. A  quite different version of antirealism 
is empiricism (as a  view discussed primarily in the philosophy of 
science), which maintains that only the observable world is real and that 
metaphysical speculations about the existence of unobservables should 
be abandoned. According to such empiricism (e.g., instrumentalism), 
scientific theories should be interpreted as mere instruments of 
calculation and prediction, instead of sets of mind-independently true or 
false statements about (unobservable) reality. Furthermore, nominalism 
(in the universals debate) is a form of antirealism in the sense of claiming 
that there are no mind- and language-independent universals, only 
particulars. Yet, nominalists could be realists in other ways; for example, 
several influential contemporary scientific realists are nominalists in 
metaphysics. The varieties of antirealism are by no means exhausted by 
these well-known and much disputed doctrines.
Finally, an  important distinction ought to be drawn between 
antirealisms and nonrealisms. Not all denials of realism can be simply 
classified as antirealisms. For example, richard rorty has repeatedly 
claimed that his ‘antirepresentationalism’ leads us beyond the entire issue 
of realism, which in his view crucially depends on representationalist 
assumptions, that is, on the idea that the business of language-use is to 
represent non-linguistic and mind-independent reality and that it may 
succeed or fail in this task.3 Another influential nonrealist position in the 
philosophy of science in particular was formulated in the 1980s by Arthur 
Fine with the label ‘NoA’, ‘the natural ontological attitude’. The ‘NoAist’ 
just accepts the ontological postulations of science, avoiding any further 
3 See, e.g., richard rorty, Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 1998).
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philosophical speculation, problematization, or interpretation of them.4 
These nonrealisms, which can be regarded as close relatives, cannot be 
discussed here, but I want to note that the version of pragmatic realism 
to be articulated and tentatively defended below is not committed to 
the kind of rortyan antirepresentationalist neopragmatism that has 
given a fertile context to nonrealism. It is realism itself that we can and 
should, I think, save through pragmatism, even though the realism thus 
saved will have to be a thoroughly revised one. (Similarly, pragmatism 
may and should accommodate its own specific – pragmatic – notion of 
representation instead of giving up representationalism altogether.)
After this preliminary survey, we should take a  closer look at how 
the different forms of realism and antirealism – or, more modestly, some 
key variants of them – are applicable to the philosophy of religion and 
theology.
APPlYING reAlISm(S) To THeoloGY AND relIGIoN
The problem of realism in theology and religion obviously concerns the 
(in)dependence of the world and/or objects purportedly referred to in 
religious and/or theological language-use. These objects could include 
God, souls, angels, and many other things traditionally postulated in 
religious practices and theological theorization. At least in principle, it is 
possible to be a local realist about some of these ontological commitments 
while being an antirealist about some others: for instance, one could be 
a  realist about God’s existence while being an antirealist about angels. 
That is, one could maintain that it is a  mind-independently objective 
matter whether or not God exists, and which properties God has (if 
He does exist), while maintaining that statements about the existence 
of angels, or about their properties, do not have mind-independently 
determined objective truth-values. Note, however, that at least according 
to most formulations of realism and antirealism, one does not qualify 
as an  antirealist about God if one just denies God’s existence  – or as 
an antirealist about angels if one just denies their existence, because one 
may very well be a realist about the features of the mind-independent 
4 See Arthur Fine, The Shaky Game, 2nd ed. (Chicago and london: The university of 
Chicago Press, 1996; 1st ed. 1986). I critically discuss Fine’s NoA from the point of view 
of the philosophy of religion in Sami Pihlström, ‘A Pragmatic Critique of Three Kinds of 
religious Naturalism’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 17 (2005), 177-218.
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world itself that make it the case that there is no God, or no angels. 
Atheism is not antirealism but typically presupposes realism.
There are, to be more precise, different ‘levels’ of realism about 
religion. At least four such levels can be distinguished. It is helpful 
to introduce these distinctions by referring to the relevant relations 
between practices of language-use and the relevant objects that those 
practices of language-use can be supposed to be about. First, we may 
apply the realism issue to religious language itself – that is, to the relation 
between religious language and its objects (whatever they are). Secondly, 
we may speak about realism and antirealism in relation to theological 
(e.g., Christian, Jewish, or Islamic) language and its objects. Thirdly, 
we may distinguish the language of non-confessional religious studies 
(or comparative religion) – and its objects – from the first two levels. 
Fourthly, and finally, the language of philosophy of religion  – and its 
objects, whatever they might be – is a yet higher ‘meta-level’ context for 
investigating realism in relation to religion.
Accordingly, when asking whether to be realists or antirealists 
about religious matters, we may ask this question at four different 
levels (at least), that is, as the question of whether there are, e.g., mind-
independent truths about objective reality in (1) religion, (2) theology, 
(3) religious studies, and (4) philosophy of religion. let us pursue these 
questions in turn.
First, according to religious realism, the objects of religious beliefs 
and/or statements (e.g., God) exist, or fail to exist, independently of 
religious language-use. That is to say, God is real or unreal independently 
of whether you, I, or anyone believes Him to be real. If God exists, He 
will continue to exist even if no one believes in His existence.5 And 
conversely, if God does not exist, He will not come into existence no 
matter how strongly He is believed in. religious antirealism denies 
5 In a more careful presentation of religious realism (and antirealism), it would be 
important to distinguish between reality and existence. one might, for instance, construe 
God along the lines of Charles S. Peirce’s ‘extreme scholastic realism’ as a ‘real general’, 
arguing that God does not exist in the way in which particular objects, such as stones or 
galaxies, exist but is nevertheless real in the way in which general tendencies, habits, or 
modalities (e.g., laws of nature) are. Accordingly, God would be something like a general 
world-process instead of being a mere individual entity existing in the world. on Peirce’s 
realism about generality, see a  number of influential essays collected in The Essential 
Peirce, 2 vols, The Peirce edition Project, ed. Nathan Houser et al. (bloomington: Indiana 
university Press, 1992-98), including the famous 1871 ‘berkeley review’ (in vol. 1) and 
several later essays on pragmatism and pragmaticism (in vol. 2).
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this independence and regards God as mind-dependent in some sense, 
for instance, as a  construction based on religious language-use, or 
a discourse-independent construal, as some postmodernist orientations 
in philosophy of religion might put it.
Secondly, according to theological realism, certain theological 
doctrines are mind-independently true or false, depending only on 
the way the (religious) world objectively is. For example, the doctrine 
of divine simplicity – that is, the view that God is the simplest possible 
object, which may also be taken to entail the view that all of God’s 
attributes, such as His absolute goodness and omnipotence, are identical 
to God himself – is either true or false depending on the true metaphysical 
nature of God. either God is the way this doctrine says He is, or He is not 
that way; it is not up to the theological doctrine to determine what God’s 
metaphysical nature is, but it is the other way round. The truth or falsity 
of the doctrine is grounded in the nature of the world, and of God. The 
theological antirealist, again, denies such independence, maintaining 
that the truth or falsity of the kind of doctrines at issue here depends on 
their theological formulation, or our theological perspectives on God 
and the world.
It may, however, be difficult to draw the exact line between religious 
and theological language-use, and the corresponding versions of realism 
(and antirealism), although generally theological doctrines could 
be regarded as meta-level interpretations of actual religious beliefs. 
Christological, pneumatological, soteriological, and other sophisticated 
interpretations of Christian beliefs – regarding, respectively, the nature 
of Christ, the Holy Spirit, and salvation – can be regarded as doctrines 
belonging to this set of meta-level theological construals of ‘first-order’ 
religious beliefs. A  ‘normal’ believer need not, and typically does not, 
have the kind of theological sophistication that the formulation and 
understanding of these doctrines requires. one’s entitlement to religious 
realism cannot therefore depend on one’s being a realist (or an antirealist) 
about the meta-level theological doctrines.
one could, then, in principle, be a  religious realist about, say, 
the existence of Christ but an  antirealist about some more specific 
theological views, such as the doctrine of Christ’s second coming. but 
could one be a  theological realist while being a  religious antirealist? 
This would, presumably, be an  awkward position. one could hardly 
reasonably maintain that the truth-values of claims about Christ’s 
second coming are mind-independent and objective while denying such 
45PrAGmATIST PerSPeCTIVeS oN THeoloGICAl reAlISm
mind-independence and objectivity to claims about God’s existence. 
Furthermore, it may also be difficult to determine what it is to be a realist 
about Christ if one is not committed to the theological doctrines that 
define Christ. Which specific doctrines should be taken to play such 
a  defining role? This may be a  matter of theological dispute. Does 
Christ (or, for that matter, God) have only essential properties or also 
contingent ones? Could one, then, be an antirealist about a doctrine such 
as Christ’s second coming, let alone a  highly central doctrine such as 
Christ’s resurrection (or, say, Christ’s two natures), without also being 
an antirealist at the basic religious level about God?6
The third level to be discussed is the problem of realism about religious 
studies. This may be compared to the more general realism issue that arises 
in the human sciences (such as history, anthropology, cultural studies, 
literary theory, and other fields): is the human cultural and social world 
also mind-independently and objectively the way it is (more or less like 
the scientific realist about natural science believes the natural world to 
be), so that truths about it are determined independently of our theories 
and discourses, or is it somehow a human cultural-theoretical construct, 
possibly in a stronger sense than the natural world? The age-old nature 
vs. culture distinction is of course in some sense presupposed here. 
Scientific realism in the natural sciences must certainly be distinguished 
from realism about the humanities and social sciences. There is clearly 
a  sense in which human culture and society are human and therefore 
mind-dependent constructs, but the intended sense of ‘independence’ 
should be understood correctly here; certainly there is no a priori reason 
why one could not apply realism across the board, not only in the 
sciences but also in the humanities. even if it may not be easy to regard 
human sciences such as literary theory as pursuing objective truth in 
6 Theological and religious views and problems may also influence our views on 
realism in other domains: for example, the problem of evil has typically been discussed 
presupposing moral realism; it may look quite different if one begins from moral 
antirealism. Cf. T.l. Carson, ‘Axiology, realism, and the Problem of evil’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), 349-368. Carson argues that J.l. mackie 
(a famous critic of moral realism and theism) seems to assume the truth of moral realism 
in his discussion of the problem of evil (see mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments 
For and Against the Existence of God (oxford and New York: oxford university Press, 
1983)), because he assumes that pain or suffering is mind-independently bad or evil. 
For a discussion of the problem of evil in relation to pragmatist philosophy of religion, 
see Sami Pihlström, Pragmatic Pluralism and the Problem of God (New York: Fordham 
university Press, 2013), chapter 5.
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the same sense in which we may regard physics or biology as pursuing 
objective truth, there is no principled reason why our statements and 
theories in these different fields could not be objectively true or false 
depending on the ways in which the (admittedly very different) objects 
of study are. The objects of the human sciences are not independent of 
human thought and action, but they could still be independent of the 
theorist’s or scholar’s views and experiences in a sense relevantly similar 
to the mind-independence of physical particles.
Now, insofar as religious studies (or comparative religion) is part of 
the ‘human sciences’ in the same sense as history or anthropology are, 
the realism debate in the latter is directly applicable to the former, or the 
former is only a special case of the latter. of course it must be kept in 
mind that the social and cultural world of religion, any more than the 
cultural world generally, is not ‘mind-independent’ in the same sense as 
physical nature is (according to the realist); yet, again, it can (arguably) be 
independent of the researchers’ – the religious studies scholars’ – minds, 
or of their theories, in an analogous sense.7
The relation between religious studies and theology is far from clear, 
however. Theological doctrines, such as (again) divine simplicity or 
Christ’s second coming, could be and often are seen as ‘confessional’: 
to be a  Christian is to maintain that these and many other doctrines 
about God, Christ, and related matters are true (though it may be 
open to further discussion what it practically means in religious life 
to be committed to their truth).8 However, theological doctrines can 
7 Does the ‘miracle argument’, which we owe to philosophers of science such as Hilary 
Putnam and richard boyd, work in theology or religious studies? This further question, 
though highly interesting, cannot be pursued here. The miracle argument – as analyzed 
and defended, for instance, in Putnam’s Mathematics, Matter, and Method (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1975) – is the argument according to which only realism 
can adequately explain the fact that science has been enormously successful in its 
practical applications, including technology. unless the theories in advanced sciences 
were at least approximately true and unless the theoretical terms of those theories (at 
least approximately) referred to real entities in the world, this success of science would 
be a  ‘miracle’, an unexplainable cosmic coincidence. The reason why there may be no 
clear analogy to this argument in either theology or religious studies is that there may 
be no clearly identifiable empirical success to be explained. At least the question about 
the empirical and/or practical success of these disciplines is much less straightforward.
8 Perhaps one could, after all, be a realist about theological doctrines in the sense of 
claiming that they are objectively true or false, while being an  antirealist about their 
implementations in actual religious life, viewing such life as a  matter of symbols and 
rituals rather than any propositionally expressible theological commitments.
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also be studied entirely ‘neutrally’ and non-confessionally as objects of 
religious believers’ (and theologians’) beliefs – and the one who engages 
in such non-confessional study need not at all engage in the practices, 
either religious or theological, within which those beliefs are actually 
maintained, or taken to be true. Thus, it may be a result of theological 
inquiry that a religious group X maintains, or has maintained at some 
point in its history, a doctrine Y (e.g., as interpreted in a certain way). 
Is this still theology, or is it, rather, religious studies? or perhaps 
comparative religion? The disciplinary identities may be extremely 
unclear here. In the Nordic countries, for instance, theology is usually 
understood as a non-confessional study of religious beliefs, doctrines, 
practices, their history, etc. The theologian need not be committed to 
the doctrines s/he studies, or to any religious ideas. This is the case, for 
instance, at the university of Helsinki Faculty of Theology in Finland. 
In some other religious and theological traditions, it may be harder to 
understand, or even inconceivable, that one could engage in theology 
while avoiding religious commitments altogether.
If theology can be pursued without commitments to any Christian 
or other theological doctrines, then there is no fundamental distinction 
between theology and religious studies, nor between the relevant versions 
of the realism vs. antirealism debate. The same general points about 
realism in the human sciences will then apply to religious studies and 
theology alike. However, if theology is interpreted confessionally, then one 
could be a realist about a theological doctrine while being an antirealist 
about a  meta-level interpretation and/or explanation of that doctrine 
within non-confessional religious studies (comparative religion). but 
is the converse position coherent? Could one be a realist about a non-
confessional interpretation of a  religious doctrine about which one is 
a theological antirealist? I am tempted to answer affirmatively. one can 
of course be a realist about, for example, historical issues regarding the 
emergence, prevalence, and maintenance of certain theological ideas 
and/or views in certain historical or contemporary communities while 
rejecting theological realism about those ideas themselves. one need not 
be a realist about, say, angels, even if one is a strong realist about religious 
studies examining people’s and communities’ beliefs in angels. even so, 
it might be more natural to maintain a realistic commitment across the 
board, at both levels.
Fourthly, how about philosophy (of religion)? Things get even 
more complicated when the philosophy of religion enters the picture 
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to supplement the practices of religion, theology, and religious studies. 
Philosophy of religion can be more or less directly concerned with 
religious concepts and beliefs, but it can also examine their relation to 
both theological interpretations and non-confessional explanations 
and accounts offered within religious studies. We may here also want 
to distinguish, on the one hand, philosophy of religion, and on the 
other hand, philosophy of science – or something corresponding to the 
philosophy of science – as applied to (i) the ‘science’ of theology (if it 
can be regarded as a science in any sense) and to (ii) the inquiries within 
religious studies.
Does philosophy of religion have any ‘objects of its own’? Can one be 
a realist (or an antirealist) about the language used within the philosophy 
of religion, and the relation between that language-use and its relevant 
objects? Arguably, the complex relations between the objects of religion, 
theology, and religious studies, and the relations between the different 
ways (different languages) of speaking about those objects, can be among 
the ‘objects’ of the philosophy of religion.
The more general question, not to be answered here, is whether 
there can be mind-independent and objective facts about philosophical 
theories and their actual or potential objects at all. Is there, moreover, 
a mind-independent and objective truth about, say, realism itself (or other 
topics in the philosophy of religion, such as the nature of evil)? That is, 
is it objectively and mind-independently true or false that realism holds, 
or does not hold, about religious views, about theological doctrines, 
or about the results of religious studies inquiries? (Are the statements 
made in this essay on realism mind-independently and objectively true 
or false, accurately representing a subject matter independent of them?) 
The ‘reality’ studied by the philosophy of religion should include all the 
levels of the realism debate: religious and theological entities (e.g., God), 
as well as relevant human activities within which such entities  – and 
questions concerning their existence – are referred to, spoken about, and 
inquired into.
As has become clear through this discussion, however preliminary it 
must remain, there is a certain analogy between scientific realism and the 
different realisms applied to religion and theology. However, even though 
this analogy may be helpful, it may also be seriously misleading; at least 
we should be careful to avoid too easy analogies. The entire attempt to 
discuss theological realism by means of an analogy to scientific realism 
is, arguably, problematic, as it presupposes an  evidentialist view of 
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theology as relevantly comparable to science. According to evidentialism, 
religious beliefs – as well as, by extension, their theological meta-level 
interpretations  – need to be evaluated on the basis of the rationally 
acceptable evidence that can be presented in their favour, just as one 
would generally evaluate scientific (and everyday) beliefs. realism and 
antirealism cannot, then, be strictly separated from the evidentialism vs. 
fideism issue (although these two issues are in principle distinct); this is 
part of a broadly Kantian entanglement of metaphysics and epistemology. 
Pragmatism (which we will discuss below in a bit more detail) rejects 
evidentialism, while also rejecting straightforward versions of fideism, 
and hence also the direct scientific realism analogy.
When developing a  pragmatist approach to the realism debate (in 
science, religion, and theology – and elsewhere), the genuine differences 
between all these practices must be appreciated. This, we might say, is to 
embrace a ‘practical realism’ about the realism debate itself.9
A PrAGmATIST APProACH To THe reAlISm DebATe
The philosophical tradition of pragmatism offers a  fresh perspective 
on the realism vs. antirealism issue. The rest of this paper is devoted to 
showing – inevitably only very briefly – what the pragmatist contribution 
might be, and how it could, especially in the philosophy of religion, be 
enriched by considerations adapted from the theory of recognition.
The so-called classical pragmatists – Charles S. Peirce, William James, 
and John Dewey10 – all defended views that can be regarded as to some 
9 Cf. rein Vihalemm, ‘Practical realism: Against Standard Scientific realism and 
Anti-realism’, Studia Philosophia Estonica, 5:2 (2012), 7-22. For example, the criticism 
of the ‘realist aims’ of theology by Wang-Yen lee (see lee, ‘A Pragmatic Case against 
Pragmatic Theological realism’, The Heythrop Journal, 50 (2009), 479-494) by analogy 
to constructive empiricism starts from the problematic assumption that theological 
theories are to be seen as ‘scientific’, in principle open to similar empirical considerations 
as scientific theories. I  am not sure that ‘theological constructive empiricism’ even 
makes any sense (even though constructive empiricism about religious studies might 
make sense, while I would certainly not recommend maintaining that, or any, version 
of constructive empiricism as an  alternative to (pragmatic) scientific realism). For 
a treatment of pragmatism as a third option between evidentialism and fideism, as well as 
realism and antirealism, in the philosophy of religion, see Pihlström, Pragmatic Pluralism 
and the Problem of God (cited above).
10 For a collection of historical and systematic discussions of pragmatism, old and 
new, see Sami Pihlström (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism (london and 
New York: Continuum, 2011).
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extent realistic but to some extent anti- or nonrealistic – or, if not strictly 
speaking antirealistic, at least in some sense idealistic or constructivist 
(even though it also needs to be pointed out that none of the classical 
pragmatists was really tempted to defend any form of relativism). The 
tensions we find in these thinkers’ positions regarding realism and its 
alternatives illuminate the ways in which the realism issue has been and 
continues to be at the heart of the pragmatist tradition in philosophy.11 
A similar tension seems to be at work in contemporary neopragmatism, 
that is, in the thought of philosophers like richard rorty and Hilary 
Putnam. In theology and philosophy of religion specifically, this 
tradition has more recently been represented by figures such as eberhard 
Herrmann and Dirk-martin Grube.12
Pragmatism can be seen as a  philosophical approach seeking to 
mediate between realism and antirealism in a  manner comparable to 
Immanuel Kant’s attempt to argue that empirical realism is compatible 
with (and even requires) transcendental idealism. more critically, this 
means that the realism vs. antirealism tension is indeed inevitably 
present in pragmatism, both classical and ‘neo’. However, the pragmatists 
have typically attempted to move beyond this tension in interesting 
ways. The relevant tension that needs to be dealt with here can be briefly 
expressed as follows: the world is (empirically) independent of us, but its 
independence is itself a human construct within our purposive practices 
11 See Pihlström, Pragmatic Pluralism and the Problem of God, as well as my earlier 
works on pragmatism and realism, including Sami Pihlström, ‘Structuring the World: The 
Issue of realism and the Nature of ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary 
Pragmatism’, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 59 (Helsinki: The Philosophical Society of 
Finland, 1996). See also Sami Pihlström, ‘Pragmatic realism’, forthcoming in Westphal 
(ed.), Realism, Science, and Pragmatism (cited above).
12 See, e.g., eberhard Herrmann, ‘A  Pragmatic realist Philosophy of religion’, Ars 
Disputandi, 3 (2003), available at: <www.arsdisputandi.org>. See also Herrmann, 
‘realism, Semantics and religion’, in Timo Koistinen and Tommi lehtonen (eds.), 
Philosophical Studies in Religion, Metaphysics and Ethics (Helsinki: luther-Agricola 
Society, 1997), 77-94. In this essay, Herrmann draws on Putnam in arguing that sciences 
and ‘views of life’ such as religions have different functions and hence different notions 
of truth. In the latter, being true means not ‘to be the case’ (as in science) but to be ‘true 
to life’ in a qualitative sense, with true expressions being ‘adequate expressions of what 
it means to be a human being’ (p. 92). See also, for an excellent recent contribution to 
a re-evaluation of the pragmatist perspective on theological and religious realism along 
broadly Putnamian lines, Niek brunsveld, The Many Faces of Religious Truth: Developing 
Hilary Putnam’s Pragmatic Pluralism into an  Alternative for Religious Realism and 
Antirealism (Diss., university of utrecht, The Netherlands, 2012).
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and may receive different forms within different practices. moreover, 
the world and whatever exists or is real within it can exhibit a number 
of different practice-laden forms of mind-independence. For example, 
the mind-independence of electrons, of historical facts, and of God (if, 
indeed, all of these entities or structures are mind-independently real) 
are all quite different kinds of mind-independence, and it makes sense 
to speak about these different kinds only within different purposive 
practices in which they play some functional roles. The practice of 
physical science within which the independent existence of electrons is 
at issue does not, presumably, have any role for God to play, but on the 
other hand the religious person’s prayer addressed to a God believed to 
be real independently of that activity of praying hardly presupposes that 
electrons, or any other pieces of the material world, are real. There is 
no need to reduce all these to the same essence of what it means to be 
mind-independent. Pragmatic realism – if we may use such a label – is 
itself ‘practice-involving’, not just a  view maintained for ‘practical’ 
(e.g., non-theoretical or instrumental) reasons. rearticulating realism 
itself, like religion, in terms of human practices is the key program of 
pragmatic realism. This program is very different from the more radical 
neopragmatist program of giving up realism, or even the issue of realism 
altogether (as rorty suggests).
Some contemporary pragmatists, including eberhard Herrmann, 
have suggested that the realism issue in religion and theology can be 
fruitfully articulated in terms of Putnam’s distinction between internal 
and metaphysical realism.13 According to Herrmann, Putnam’s internal 
realism can plausibly be used as a  model for realism in theology and 
religion. While I  am not entirely convinced by this proposal, let me 
briefly recapitulate the main points of Putnam’s form of realism; this 
will only serve as an example of an influential and theologically relevant 
version of neopragmatism here.
one of Putnam’s characterizations of the difference between internal 
and metaphysical realism is based on his observation that our perceptions 
and conceptions of the world are relative to language and/or conceptual 
schemes, since ‘elements of what we call “language” or “mind” penetrate 
so deeply into what we call “reality” that the very project of representing 
ourselves as being “mappers” of something “language-independent” is 
13 See the publications cited in the previous note, including brunsveld’s 2012 
dissertation.
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fatally compromised from the very start’.14 This formulation seems to 
employ a  relatively straightforward idea of language-dependence 
(or mind-dependence). The contrasting view, metaphysical realism, 
maintains that we can, in principle at least, theorize about a language- 
and mind-independent world an  sich, as it is independently of our 
thoughts and language-use. The basic point of internal realism is that 
there is no such external, disengaged viewpoint available for us. All our 
engagements with reality begin from an internal standpoint that already 
involves human practices and linguistic categorizations of reality. one 
way of summarizing this distinction between two kinds of realism is by 
saying that metaphysical realism dreams of a theocentric conception of 
the world, while internal realism argues that we human beings cannot 
get rid of our anthropocentric, and therefore inevitably limited and 
contextual, ways of coping with reality. This corresponds to the way in 
which the world has, in the pragmatist tradition more generally, been 
seen as a ‘human world’, as in a way plastic or malleable to human beings’ 
purposeful actions and practice-related conceptual categorization.15
A pragmatist perspective on theological realism can be summarized 
in terms of the following key points, which arguably represent the main 
strengths of pragmatism in comparison to more standard versions of 
theological/religious realism and antirealism. First, pragmatism should 
be firmly set against scientism (e.g., strong and reductive forms of 
scientific realism): non-scientific perspectives and practices are equally 
important for us as scientific ones. Secondly, even if scientific realism 
in its strongest forms cannot be accepted, there is, nevertheless, a kind 
of realistic spirit operative in pragmatism.16 This is especially clear in 
14 Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant (Cambridge, mA 
and london: Harvard university Press, 1990), p. 28.
15 See, e.g., William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking 
(1907), eds. Frederick H. burkhardt, Fredson bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis 
(Cambridge, mA and london: Harvard university Press, 1975), chapter 8. on the 
distinction between theocentric and anthropocentric perspectives as parallel to the 
Kantian distinction between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, 
see Henry e. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An  Interpretation and Defense – 
a Revised and Enlarged Edition (New Haven, CT and london: Yale university Press, 2004; 
1st ed. 1983). on Putnam’s approach to metaphysical issues in the philosophy of religion, 
see also Hilary Putnam, ‘God and the Philosophers’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31 
(1997), 175-187.
16 I  am adopting the phrase ‘realistic spirit’ from Cora Diamond’s Wittgenstein-
inspired work; see her The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, mA and london: The mIT Press, 
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James’s reflections on the brute reality of pain, suffering, evil, and death; 
these ethically pregnant themes seem to be, for the Jamesian pragmatist, 
in the end much more important than purely theoretical construals of 
realism vs. antirealism. more generally, thirdly, it can be argued that 
ethics and metaphysics are deeply entangled in pragmatism, both in 
early pragmatism such as James’s and in more recent pragmatism such 
as Putnam’s. According to these pragmatists, there is a sense in which 
our metaphysical construals and categorizations of reality depend on our 
ethical perspectives; thus, the relevant realism issues are also entangled.17
These basic points about pragmatism correspond to the ways in 
which I see pragmatism as a major promise in the philosophy of religion 
more generally. Epistemically, pragmatism seeks to move beyond the 
evidentialism vs. fideism controversy and to thereby transform the 
debates on the rationality vs. irrationality and objectivity vs. subjectivity 
of religious belief (both of which are closely related to, while not 
being identical with, the realism vs. antirealism issue). Existentially, 
pragmatism, at least in the form in which I  am hoping to develop it, 
seeks to move beyond ‘theodicist’ attempts to solve the problem of evil; 
responding to the reality of evil – in a ‘realistic spirit’ – is thereby seen 
as a major challenge for any ethically serious religious and theological 
thought.18 The epistemic and the existential challenges in contemporary 
philosophy of religion are, of course, entangled – as should be clear, for 
instance, on the basis of the undeniable relevance of moral realism and 
antirealism to the problem of evil.
There are also further pragmatist ideas that may seem to be only 
indirectly related to realism but are nevertheless relevant to it. For example, 
most pragmatists have been non-reductive naturalists of some kind; the 
key example of such a position in the philosophy of religion would be 
1991). See also Sami Pihlström, ‘Pragmatic Pluralism and realism in the Philosophy 
of religion’, in Henrik rydenfelt and Sami Pihlström (eds.), William James on Religion 
(basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 78-107.
17 See Sami Pihlström, Pragmatist Metaphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of 
Ontology (london: Continuum, 2009). Putnam’s key work in this area is Hilary Putnam, 
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, mA and london: 
Harvard university Press, 2002).
18 I  briefly deal with these epistemic and existential challenges in Sami Pihlström, 
‘rationality, recognition, and Anti-Theodicy: on the Promise of Pragmatist Philosophy 
of religion’, Pragmatism Today, 4:2 (2013), available at: <http://www.pragmatismtoday.
eu>. See also Pihlström, Pragmatic Pluralism and the Problem of God, chapter 5.
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Dewey’s pragmatic religious naturalism.19 moreover, pragmatists’ general 
attempt to occupy a  middle ground between realism and antirealism 
leads to the need to examine the complex relation between relativism 
and pluralism. It must be somehow secured that the idea of a plurality 
of acceptable (and, possibly, equally rational) human practices and 
perspectives does not lead to a full-blown relativism according to which 
there are in the end no normative standards governing human reason-
use and theorization at all, or no reasonable choices to be made between 
rival perspectives. Finally, the relations between religion, ethics, and 
politics need to be taken very seriously by any pragmatist who claims that 
philosophy of religion ought to make a difference to the ways in which 
human beings live in this world. That is, what is the place of religion in 
the public sphere, and how should it, possibly, be reconsidered? While 
this issue may not seem to be closely related to the problem of realism, 
it can be argued that it does in the end have a  deep connection with 
that issue. ethical and political realism need to be reconsidered from the 
point of view of the problem of introducing, or reintroducing, religious 
and theological perspectives into public discussions. (This paper will not 
take any stand on this set of problems; I am just mentioning this topic 
as an example of the way in which pragmatist philosophy of religion can 
seek to be truly practically relevant.)
All these aspects of pragmatist philosophy of religion have dimensions 
that touch the realism debate. For example, should we settle the realism 
issue (at some specific level) before making any commitments regarding 
‘religion in the public sphere’? or can we leave the realism issue open? 
Furthermore, when developing pragmatic religious or theological 
realism, the multi-level structure of the realism issue examined in the 
previous section must be kept in mind: one could be a pragmatic realist 
about religion while being an  antirealist about theology or religious 
studies, or vice versa. These commitments arguably require holistic 
pragmatic assessment.20
19 See John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, CT and london: Yale university 
Press, 1991; first published 1934).
20 The ‘holistic pragmatism’ defended by morton White, e.g., in his A Philosophy of 
Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton university Press, 
2002), could at this point be invoked as a systematization of pragmatist philosophy of 
religion and pragmatist methodology in general. That must remain to be discussed on 
another occasion, however.
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reCoGNITIoN AND reCoGNITIoN-TrANSCeNDeNCe
The pragmatist philosopher of religion may, furthermore, apply the 
(broadly Hegelian) concept of recognition (Anerkennung): it may be 
argued that our religious identities are largely based on relations of 
mutual recognition – loosely employing the concept of recognition as 
articulated by Axel Honneth and his many followers and critics.21 one 
key idea here, keeping in mind the general entanglement of ethics and 
metaphysics in pragmatism, is that the ethical relations of recognition 
may be primary to the ontological relations constituting our identities. 
Could the relations between realists and antirealists also be analyzed in 
terms of recognition? In particular, how should we make sense of the 
idea of recognizing a person (or a community) as being committed to 
shared norms of rational thought and/or inquiry (that is, as a member of 
the same community of inquirers)?22 Furthermore, how exactly should 
we distinguish between the notions of recognition, tolerance, and 
agreement – and make sense of the fact that these are, indeed, different 
notions, playing somewhat different roles in our habits of action and 
in our practices of sharing an  ethically problematic world with other 
human beings?
Instead of attempting to provide answers to these questions, let alone 
a  general treatment of recognition in the philosophy of religion, even 
just pragmatist philosophy of religion, let me in the rest of this essay 
take up the more specific theme concerning recognition and recognition-
transcendence in pragmatic realism. There is a sense in which antirealism, 
e.g., relativism or fideism about religion (both culminating in some kind 
of rejection of objectivity), makes recognition too easy: we can certainly 
(mutually) recognize each other as utterers of ‘inarticulate sounds’ or as 
mere ‘enunciators’ whose words have no normatively evaluable content.23 
21 Cf. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am main: Suhrkamp, 
2003; first published 1992). For a recent attempt to apply the concept of recognition to 
theology, see risto Saarinen, ‘Anerkennungstheorien und ökumenische Theologie’, in 
T. bremer (ed.), Ökumene – überdacht (Quaestiones disputatae 259, Freiburg: Herder, 
2013), pp.  237-261. I  make my own first preliminary attempt to connect pragmatism 
and the theory of recognition with each other in the field of philosophy of religion in 
Pihlström, ‘rationality, recognition, and Anti-Theodicy’ (cited above).
22 Arguably, the Kantian idea of a moral community is based on a mutual recognition 
among autonomous agents necessary for this (and therefore recognition is not only 
a Hegelian notion). I am grateful to Philip rossi for a discussion of this point.
23 I am here helping myself to phrases familiar from Wittgensteinian and Putnamian 
contexts. Cf., e.g., Hilary Putnam, Words and Life, ed. James Conant (Cambridge, mA 
and london: Harvard university Press, 1994).
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This is what relativism, arguably, ultimately leads to. but when it comes 
to judgments with normatively evaluable content, objectivity becomes 
a challenge for us, something to be pursued in the ‘space of reasons’.24 
Then, if we slide toward the other extreme  – strong objectivity and 
realism (e.g., metaphysical realism in Putnam’s sense, as briefly sketched 
above)  – recognition may become too difficult: we would presumably 
first have to settle whether religious beliefs can be mind-independently 
true or false, before being able to decide whether a person or a group 
is able to be ‘objective’ in this area, and to thereby recognize them as 
rational thinkers. These are in the end questions about the possibility of 
recognizing others as inquirers, as inhabitants of the space of reasons. 
but how objective do we have to be qua inquirers? recognizing ourselves 
as responsible to others in our inquiries can be argued to be a matter of 
recognizing our own fallibility and dependence on our membership in 
a community of inquirers.25
In the semantically oriented realism debate in particular (as developed 
by Putnam as well as michael Dummett), recognition-transcendent 
truths have played a major role: to be a realist is to accept that (possibly) 
recognition-transcendent statements (e.g., ‘There are no intelligent 
extraterrestrials’) are mind-independently determinately objectively true 
or false, in principle just like statements whose truth-values it is easy to 
recognize (e.g., ‘There is a cup of coffee on the table’); to be an antirealist 
is to deny this.26 Call this form of recognition-transcendence rT1. one 
could also invoke recognition-transcendence in another sense: if someone 
is ‘beyond recognition’ in the sense that s/he cannot be recognized as 
24 For an  influential contemporary employment of the notion of the space of 
reasons, which we owe to Wilfrid Sellars, see John mcDowell, Mind and World, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, mA and london: Harvard university Press, 1996; 1st ed. 1994).
25 Cf., e.g., Kenneth r. Westphal, ‘rational Justification and mutual recognition 
in Substantive Domains’, Dialogue, 52 (2013), 1-40. According to Westphal, this is 
a transcendental condition for the possibility of rational judgment. (Hence, this argument 
leads to a form of Kantian pragmatism.)
26 The kind of (arguably antirealistic) epistemic concept of truth associated with 
Putnam’s internal-realist-phase theory of truth as idealized rational acceptability, or 
epistemic justification in ideal conditions, in a way denies (at least strong) recognition-
transcendence. As is clear in his later writings, Putnam has come to reject such 
an  epistemic theory of truth altogether. See Hilary Putnam, Philosophy in an  Age of 
Science, eds. mario de Caro and David macarthur (Cambridge, mA and london: 
Harvard university Press, 2012); in this new volume, he avoids connecting these issues 
with religion and theology, though.
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something or someone in particular, under some normative description 
(e.g., as an  inquirer, or perhaps more specifically as an  inquirer into 
recognition-transcendent truths), we may regard this as another kind of 
recognition-transcendence. Call this rT2.
Now, can we recognize (in the sense of rT2) someone as a recognizer 
(or non-recognizer) of (some or all) potential recognition-transcendent 
truths (in the sense of rT1)? or should we recognize (rT2) each other 
as potential recognizers (rT1) of there being recognition-transcendent 
truths (rT1)? There is, then, a certain kind of iterability and variability 
of rT1 and rT2, yielding a potentially indefinite complexity of relations 
of recognition and recognition-transcendence.
What does this result teach us? Perhaps it only shows that metaphysical 
issues concerning rT1 need the ethically relevant perspective of rT2 – 
a perspective and a notion of recognition directed at other human beings 
instead of either mere truths (or facts) or mere principles of rationality 
or other norms. This also necessarily includes recognizing our own 
fallibility and dependence on other inquirers.27
moreover, a  point worth emphasizing here is that religious truths, 
if there are any, might be (humanly) recognition-transcendent. 
A reasonable form of religious realism, or theological realism (as well as, 
by extension, a reasonable form of realism regarding religious studies), 
needs to account for this idea. even more strongly, whether there are any 
religious truths may be recognition-transcendent. It may, arguably, be 
a feature of our religious practices and their theological interpretations 
and articulations that these limits of human recognition abilities need 
to be recognized by those (successfully) engaging in such practices or 
seeking to theologically articulate and understand them (or at least by 
anyone who could be recognized as successfully doing so). At least, at 
the meta-level, it needs to be recognized that it might be recognition-
transcendent whether religious truths (if there are any) are recognition-
transcendent or not. There are, as can easily be seen, several versions of 
recognition and recognition-transcendence at work here; a more detailed 
theory of this matter would have to sort out their relations much more 
comprehensively. Any such theory, if adequate, will also need to deal 
with the key distinction between recognizing people and recognizing 
something else – truths, principles, criteria, norms, etc. – which in this 
27 Cf. Westphal, ‘rational Justification and mutual recognition in Substantive 
Domains’, cited above.
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case amounts to the distinction between recognizing people as recognizers 
(or non-recognizers) or truths and/or their recognition-transcendence, 
on the one hand, and recognizing recognition-transcendence itself, or 
there being recognition-transcendent truths.
CoNCluSIoN
There are, we may conclude, pragmatist resources still not in full use 
in the general realism debate (and in its various localizations and 
contextualizations, for example, in the philosophy of science and in 
the discussions of social ontology), as well as in the specific debate(s) 
on realism vs. antirealism regarding religion, theology, and religious 
studies. Pragmatism may be uniquely able to critically analyze the 
relations between these levels of the debate by contextualizing them in 
the underlying purposive practices and the needs or interests they serve 
(viz., religion, theology, scientific inquiry, philosophy itself). Pragmatism 
may, indeed, be the only perspective on the realism debate that can 
seriously make sense of the idea that ‘mind-independence’ itself is not 
just a realistic ‘given’ but a human practice-laden construct. The concept 
of recognition, moreover, can be employed to enrich the pragmatist 
approach to the realism issue. This is a  further Kantian-inspired (and 
certainly not only Hegelian) development of pragmatism.
This final point about pragmatic realism being a  fundamentally 
Kantian way of thinking, in philosophy of religion and elsewhere, needs 
to be taken seriously.28 This even extends to the need to take seriously 
a  pragmatic analogy of Kantian ‘things in themselves’ (or ‘noumena’) 
in this area. Putnam himself, who generally seeks to avoid strong 
metaphysical commitments, points out that he is ‘not inclined to scoff 
at the idea of a  noumenal ground behind the dualities of experience, 
even if all attempts to talk about it lead to antinomies’; furthermore, 
he adds that because ‘one cannot talk about the transcendent or even 
deny its existence without paradox, one’s attitude to it must, perhaps, 
be the concern of religion rather than rational philosophy’.29 In some 
later writings, too, Putnam (arguing against, say, what he regards as 
28 I  have tried to argue for the entanglement of pragmatism with Kantian 
transcendental thinking in several previous works, including most recently in Pihlström, 
Pragmatic Pluralism and the Problem of God, especially chapter 1.
29 Hilary Putnam, Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 
1983), p. 226.
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pseudo-Wittgensteinian relativistic ‘language-game theology’) seems 
to maintain that a  realistic attitude to what religious perspectives are 
perspectives on is a  presupposition of making sense of religious and 
theological language-use: ‘A perspective on something cannot simply be 
“constructed”; if it is to be a perspective at all, it must be constrained by 
what it depicts [...].’30
Insofar as such a  realistic postulation of a  transcendent reality of 
religion cannot really be spoken about in any normal language, pragmatic 
realism cannot be committed to any strong epistemological realism (or 
even semantic realism) about the transcendent. It can only incorporate 
a minimal assumption of ontological realism regarding transcendence, 
along with a  fallibilist recognition of the possible recognition-
transcendence of any truths (or falsities) about it. There is something 
out there that we may have to postulate insofar as our religious attitudes 
are to have any sense in our practices (or to be sensibly denied), but 
we need to recognize that such postulations could always be completely 
mistaken. It is in terms of pragmatism itself that this kind of theological, 
religious, and philosophical attitudes and their presuppositions are to be 
critically evaluated.
Acknowledgment. early versions of this essay were presented at the Templeton 
Summer School on theological realism in mainz, Germany, in September 2013; 
and at the estonian Philosophy Conference in Tallinn, December 2013 (in 
a session honouring rein Vihalemm and his ‘practical realism’). I am indebted 
to oliver Wiertz, Thomas Schmidt, Philip rossi, Kenneth r. Westphal, as well 
as the audiences of the mainz and Tallinn events for insightful comments and 
criticism.
30 Hilary Putnam, ‘on Negative Theology’, Faith and Philosophy, 14 (1997), 407-422.
